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1. Introduction 
The Taylor principle is generally viewed as a criterion in the assessment of a monetary policy. An 
interest rate rule that satisfies this principle is viewed as a policy with stabilizing properties; by 
contrast the failure to meet the Taylor criterion is often associated with instability, i.e. equilibrium 
indeterminacy.1 In a recent paper, Galì et al. (2003) have challenged this statement. By introducing 
rule-of-thumb consumers, who consume their current income as opposed to their permanent 
income, in a standard dynamic New Keynesian sticky price model, Jordi Galì and his coauthors 
show that this changes dramatically the properties of standard interest rate rules. In a canonical New 
Keynesian model, the presence of rule-of-thumb can be a possible source of indeterminacy capable 
to generate sunspot-led aggregate fluctuations even though the interest rate rule satisfies the Taylor 
principle, since it may no longer assure equilibrium uniqueness. 
The argument of rule-of-thumb consumers, underlined by Galì et al. (2003), is further developed by 
other studies. The same authors expand it to fiscal policy; Galì et al. (2004) show how the 
interaction of the rule-of-thumb consumers with sticky prices and deficit financing can account for 
the existing evidence on the effect of government spending shocks on consumption, which else 
cannot be easily reconciled with existing optimizing business cycle models. Models in the real 
business cycle tradition often predict relatively low government spending multipliers, as a 
consequence of crowding-out effects on consumption. Nevertheless, the introduction of rule-of-
thumb consumers combined with deficit financing can raise that multiplier dramatically. 
Amato and Laubach (2003) explore the optimal monetary rule with rule-of thumb households and 
firms. By modeling consumers’ rule-of-thumb behavior as a consumption habit, households’ 
decisions today mimic past behavior of all agents, including optimizing agents. Amato and Laubach 
(2003) show that, while the monetary policy implications of rule-of-thumb firms are minimal, the 
interest rate is more sensitive to the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers; as their fraction increases 
higher inertial monetary policy is required.  
Bilbiie (2004) also considers optimal monetary policy and shows that, in presence of rule-of-thumb 
consumers, a passive interest rate rule (i.e. a rule that does not satisfy the Taylor principle) is 
consistent with a welfare-maximization. Bilbiie (2004) tackles the point from both a theoretical and 
empirical point of view. Bilbiie (2004) shows how rule-of-thumb consumer can explain the puzzle 
of monetary policy before and after the Volker. In fact, monetary policy can leads to determinacy 
even if the Taylor rule is not satisfied when enough agents do not participate in asset markets. By 
                                                 
1 See Woodford (2004) for a discussion. 
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assuming zero long-run profit due to transfer between rule-of-thumb consumers and savers2 and an 
ad hoc lag scheme in the IS curve, Bilbiie (2004) provides some empirical support to his 
hypothesis. 
Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2006) investigate the effectiveness of monetary policy. By using a New 
Keynesian DSGE model, they find that monetary policy becomes more effective as the number of 
rule-of-thumb consumers increases. As usual, a change in the interest rate affect the trade-off 
between consumption today and consumption tomorrow, but, in limited asset market participation 
economies, the change in demand also stimulates the revision of the consumption plan of rule-of-
thumb consumers. After a change in the interest rate, both spenders and savers revise their 
consumption plans in the same direction since reductions in the interest rate supports falls in current 
output and labor supply of savers and thus in aggregate real wages. Thus, even if a lower fraction of 
savers reduces the impact of interest rate policies because fewer agents smooth their consumption, it 
can sustain the effectiveness of the monetary policy by the spenders’ reaction.  
Colciago (2006) studies the determinacy properties of a New Keynesian model augmented with 
rule-of-thumb consumers when labor markets are not competitive and wages are sticky.3 He shows 
how wage stickiness implies that the Taylor Principle is a necessary condition for equilibrium 
determinacy and that a positive response of aggregate consumption to a government purchase shock 
is not a robust feature of the model. Crowding-in of consumption vanishes as wage stickiness 
dampens real wage fluctuations associated to government spending-induced variation in real 
activity. 
This paper extends the framework of Galì et al. (2003, 2004) by focusing on the interaction between 
monetary and fiscal policy in supporting the saddle-path equilibrium. More in detail, we introduce 
fiscal policy based on tax distortions and balanced government budget in a New Keynesian 
economy with rule-of-thumb consumers and capital accumulation and show that results stressed by 
Galì et al. (2004) are not indifferent to fiscal policy structure. The introduction of fiscal policy, 
based on tax distortion and balanced budget, in fact, facilitates the Taylor criterion as cornerstone of 
determinacy and restricts the spaces of sunspot-driven fluctuations in the business cycle.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next section describes the basic framework. Section 3 
derives the model dynamics around the steady state. Section 4 investigates the model properties. A 
final section concludes. 
                                                 
2 This technical assumption is needed to obtain that the steady-state share of spenders’ consumption equal to the one of 
savers so that it is independent of fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. 
3 Wages are set according to a Calvo’s lottery as in Erceg at al. (2000) or Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). 
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2. The Model 
We consider a continuum of households distributed in a unitary segment of mass one. Households 
can be of two different kinds: a fraction of them (1 λ− ) can access to the capital markets,4 whereas 
the remaining proportion (λ ) cannot and thus has to consume all the current disposable income. We 
refer to them as rule-of-thumb or non-Ricardian households and to the former as optimizing or 
Ricardian households.  
Each optimizing consumer is assumed to maximize an inter-temporal utility function given by:  
(1) ( )1
0
1
1
t o o
t t t
t
E C L
σνβ σ
∞ −
=
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦∑   
subject to the sequence of budget constraints,  
(2) ( ) ( )( )1 1 11o o K Yt t t t t t t t t t t tP C I B W N R K D B Rτ− − −+ + = + + − +   
and the capital accumulation equation  
(3) ( ) 1 1
1
1 tt t t
t
IK K K
K
δ φ− −
−
⎛ ⎞= − + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
where otC  and 
o
tL  represent consumption and leisure for optimizing household (hence we use a “o” 
superscript) and β  is the discount factor. The period utility take the Cobb-Douglas form inside a 
CRRA function, where 0σ ≥  is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of an 
aggregate factor composed by consumption and leisure, while 0ν >  denotes a cost of working. otN  
is the level of employment, where 1o ot tL N= − ; tW  denotes the nominal wage, KtR  the nominal 
return on capital, tK  the capital, tI  the investment, tD  the dividends from ownership of firms and 
tB  the quantity of nominally one-period safe bonds carried over from period 1t − ; Ytτ  denotes the 
tax rate on labor, capital income and dividends. Bonds pay a nominal interest rate tR .  
In equation (3), ( )1 1ttI tK Kφ − −  represents the capital adjustment costs, which determines the change in 
the capital stock (gross of depreciation) induced by investment spending tI . We assume ( ) 0φ′ . > , 
( ) 0φ′′ . ≤ , ( ) 1φ δ′ =  and ( )φ δ δ= . The function of the adjustment costs is convex and the 
                                                 
4 Spenders’ behavior can be interpreted in various ways, e.g. different interpretations include myopia, limited 
participation to asset markets or fear of saving. See Mankiw (2000) and references therein. Some evidence of the 
quantitative importance of rule-of-thumb consumers is provided by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Jappelli (1990), 
Shea (1995), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Fuhrer (2000), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2003) and Ahmad (2004). 
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corresponding value of the equilibrium level of the ratio investment-to-capital stock is equal to the 
depreciation rate, i.e. in the steady state there are not adjustment costs.  
The consumer selects consumption, leisure, investment and security by maximizing equation (1) 
subject to the constraints (2) and (3), in solving the inter-temporal optimization problem the tax rate 
and public expenditure are taken as exogenously given.  
By computing and rearranging the first-order conditions, one obtains the intra-temporal optimality 
condition setting the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equal to the real 
net wage; the Euler condition for the optimal inter-temporal allocation of consumption; the inter-
temporal path of the Tobin’s Q. Notice that leisure is present in the Euler condition given our 
assumption of the form of the period utility function (which is not separable).  
(4) ( )1 oY t tt o
t t
W C
P L
τ ν− =   
(5) 
( )1
1 1
1
1o ot t t
t to o
t t t t
C L PE E
C L R P
σ ν σ
β
−
+ +
+
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
(6) ( ) 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1Y K tt t t t t t t t t t t
t t
IPQ E E R E P Q
R K
τ δ φ φ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥′⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎛ ⎞ +⎜ ⎟+ + + + + +⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= − + − + − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
where ( ) 11t t t t tQ I K I Kφ −−′= ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  is the Tobin’s Q or the real shadow value of capital. 
As we have introduced before, we assume that a proportion λ  of households follow a rule-of-
thumb and do not borrow or save. We refer to them through the superscript “r.” Each period rule-of-
thumb consumers solve their maximization problem, i.e. to choose the labor and consumption path 
that maximize:  
(7) ( )1
0
1
1
t r r
t t t
t
E C L
σνβ σ
∞ −
=
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦∑  
subject to the constraint that all their labor income is consumed  
(8) ( )1r r Yt t t t tPC W N τ= −   
The associated first order condition is given by:  
(9) ( )1 rY t tt r
t t
W C
P L
τ ν− =   
which can be combined with the budget constraint, rewritten as:  
(10) ( )1r r Ytt t t
t
WC N
P
τ= −   
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By remembering that 1r rt tL N= − , we obtain a constant amount of labor for rule-of-thumb 
consumers  
(11) 1
1
r r
tN Nν= =+   
Thus, the consumption is a proportion of the real wage  
(12) ( )1 11r Ytt tt
WC
P
τν= −+   
Aggregate leisure can be rewritten in function of the employment 1t tL N= − .   
Then we can formally write the weighted average of the variables for each consumer type:  
(13) ( )1 o rt t tC C Cλ λ= − +   
(14) ( )1 o rt t tN N Nλ λ= − +   
By substituting the constant employment for the rule-of-thumb households, we derive  
(15) ( )1
1
o
t tN N
λλ ν= − + +   
The aggregate first order condition is:  
(16) ( ) ( )1 1 1Y tt t t
t
WC N
P
τν= − −   
Regarding the supply side, we consider an economy vertically differentiated composed by two 
sectors. The final sector is perfectly competitive, while the intermediate goods producers are 
monopolistic competitors. More precisely, we assume a continuum of intermediate firms, uniformly 
distributed over the unit interval. Each firm produces a differentiated intermediate good that is 
combined in a competitive final sector, which uses a Dixit and Stiglitz technology.  
The final goods technology displays constant returns of scale and does not require labor or capital to 
produce a unit of the final good, but only intermediate commodities t hY , . Formally,  
(17) ( ) 1 11 ,0t t hY Y dh
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫   
Any final good firm will potentially make profits defined by  
(18) t t t h t hPY P Y dhπ , ,= −   
Each firm sets a price at each period to maximize its profits by considering its production function. 
Formally each firm maximizes equation (18) subject to (17). The assumption of free entry implies 
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that profits will equal zero in equilibrium, the first order conditions for profit maximization lead to 
the following demand function: 
(19) 
1
t h
t h
t
Y
P
Y
ε−
,
,
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
We capture the degree of monopoly power of each firm by ( ) 11ε ε −− , when ( ) 11 1ε ε −− = , the 
technology collapses to a competitive model since the intermediate goods are perfect substitutes, the 
demand curve is perfectly elastic and none of intermediate producer will be able to exploit its 
power. Henceforth, we assume degree of monopoly power of each firm between zero and one, i.e. 
1ε > .  
The production function for a typical intermediate goods firm is given by:  
(20) 11t h t h t hY K N
α α−
, − , ,=   
where t hN ,  and t hK ,  represent the labor services and the capital, and α  the capital share. Profit 
maximization, taking the wage and the rental cost as given, is  
(21) ( ) ( )1Max 1 1N Kt h t h t h t t t h t t h tP Y W N R Kτ τ Π, , , , − ,⎡ ⎤Π = − + − −⎣ ⎦  
subject to 
1
t h
t h
t
Y
P
Y
ε−
,
,
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 and equation (20), 
where Ntτ  is the labor tax rate and tτ Π  the corporate tax rate paid by firms and exogenously taken.  
The solution of the above problem implies the following first order conditions:  
(22) 
1
1K t ht
t h t h
YR
P K
ε αε
,
, − ,
−=   
(23) ( ) ( )11 1 t hN tt
t h t h
YW
P N
ετ αε
,
, ,
−+ = −   
The firm’s first order conditions represent the input demand schedules.  
For the sake of tractability, we assume a symmetric equilibrium. In the discussion that follows we 
then impose: t h t k tY Y Y, ,= = , t h t k tC C C, ,= = , t h t k tI I I. .= = , t h t k tN N N, ,= =  for all j  and [ ]0 1k ∈ , .  
Intermediate firms set nominal prices as in Calvo (1983). Each firm resets its price with probability 
( )1 ω−  each period, while the remaining fraction ω  of producers keep their prices unchanged.  
A firm resetting its price in period t  will seek to maximize  
(24) { } 0Maxt
k
t t k t k h t t k t k
P k
E Y P P MCω
∗
∞ ⎡ ⎤∗⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ + , + +⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦=
Λ −∑   
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subject to ( )t k h t t h t kY P P Yε ε−∗+ , , += , where [ ]1 1t k t t t tR E P P−+ +Λ =  is the discount factor, tP∗  represents 
the price chosen by firms resetting prices at time t  and tMC  the marginal cost at time t .  
The first order condition for this problem is:  
(25) 
0
0
1
k
t t k t k h t t k t k
k
E Y P P MCεω ε
⎡ ⎤∞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∗⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ + , + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠= ⎣ ⎦
Λ − =−∑  
Finally, the equation describing the dynamics for the aggregate price level is given by:  
(26) ( ) 11111 1t t tP P P εεεω ω −−⎡ ⎤− ∗⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦= + −  
where tP
∗  is the optimal price chosen by firms resetting at time t .  
We assume that a central bank set the growth of interest rate in according to a standard Taylor rule 
(Taylor (1993)), in which the Taylor principle is satisfied since the nominal interest rate reacts more 
than one to the expected inflation, thus eliminating indeterminacy in the canonical model:  
(27) 1 ytt t
t
PR Y
P
πθ
θ+⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
The Government spending is endogenously determined every period by balancing, in expected 
term, the following budget constraint:  
(28) ( )1 1 1Y K Ntt t t t t t t t t t t t t t h ttPG B R W N R K D D W N B
ττ ττ
Π
− − ,Π+ = + + + + +−   
where tG  is the government purchases.  
The following standard aggregate resource constraint must also holds:  
(29) t t t tY C I G= + +   
that, of course, also includes investments and public expenditure.  
 
3. Dynamics around the Steady State 
We begin by computing the steady state then a linear representation in the percentage deviations 
around the steady state is obtained. Conditions for uniqueness or indeterminacy are investigated in 
the next section by numerical methods.  
In the long run our economy progresses to a zero-debt and a zero-inflation steady state position in 
which all variables are constant through the time. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 1P = . The 
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budget constraint for the optimizers becomes ( )( )1o o K YC I WN R K D τ+ = + + − . The steady state 
for investment, discount factor, marginal utility of wealth, Tobin’s Q are respectively: K Iδ = , 
1Rβ = , ( )o o oC L Lσν ν−⎡ ⎤ = Λ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and 1Q = .  
By using the optimality conditions, we can derive the unique steady state of consumption for 
Ricardian households and capital rental cost in function of the coefficient of time preference ρ , 
equal to r  in the long run:  
(30) ( )1 1
o
Y
o
CW
N
τ ν− = −   
(31) ( ) ( )11 1Y KRτ δ ρ δβ− = − − = +  
The same is for the rule-of-thumb consumers:  
(32) ( ) ( )1 11r r Y YWC WN τ τν= − = −+   
The steady-state analysis for the intermediate firms yields the following results 1 ,Y K Nα α−=  
1,KR MC YKα −=  ( ) 11 1N W MC YNτ α −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠+ = −  and 1P P MCµ∗= = = , where ( ) 11MC ε ε −= −  
stands for marginal cost and ( ) 11µ ε ε −= −  is the mark-up. It follows that:  
(33) 
KR K MC
Y
αα µ= =    
(34) ( )
1 1
1 1N N
WN MC
Y
α α
τ µ τ
− −= =+ +  
Government and aggregate resource constraints are in the long run equal to:  
(35) ( ) 1Y K NG WN R K D D WNττ ττ
Π
Π= + + + +−   
(36) ( ) ( ) ( )11 11N KY C I G WN R K D MC Y MC Yτ τ Π= + + = + + + = + −−   
From equation (36) dividends are ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1N KD Y WN R K Yτ τ τ εΠ Π −⎡ ⎤= − + − − = −⎣ ⎦ , thus:  
(37) 1D
Y
τ
ε
Π−=   
The share of public expenditure is  
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(38) 
( ) ( )1 1 11
1
Y YY N
g Ns
τ τ τ ε αα τ τ
µ τ ε
Π − + + −⎡ ⎤− + ⎣ ⎦= ++   
By combining equations (31) and (33), we obtain the share of investment:  
(39) ( )
1 1
Y
is
αδ τ ε
ρ δ ε
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠− −= +   
The share of consumption is easily determined from 1c i gs s s= − − :  
(40) ( )
1
1
Y
c gs s
αδ τ
µ ρ δ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠−= − − +   
After some algebra, we obtain the steady state level of aggregate employment:5  
(41) 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Y
N Y N Y
g
N
s
α ρ δ τ
ν ρ δ τ µ αδ τ τ α ρ δ τ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
− + −= + − + − − + + − + −   
After some tedious algebra, we can rewrite: ( ) ( ) 11 1oN Nλ λ ν −= − + + , ( )( )1 1 1 YC W Nν τ−= − − , 
( ) ( )11 1o YC W ν τ−= + − . By combining these aggregate equations, it is possible to obtain the 
consumption steady state ratios, by using ( )1 1 o rλ γ λγ= − + , in fact, it follows that 11o rCo C λγλγ −−= =  
and 11 1
rC
r C N
ν
νγ + −= = .  
In our framework, the steady state properties consist of zero-inflation and zero-debt. Disregarding 
on tax rate, the resulting linear equations of the firm’s optimality conditions are:  
(42) ( )1 1t t ty k nα α−= + −   
(43) 1ˆ
K
t t t t tr p y kµ −− = − + −   
(44) ˆt t t t tw p y nµ− = − + −   
(45) ( )( )1 1 1 ˆt t t tE βω ωπ β π µω+
− −= −   
where ˆtµ  represents the (log)deviations of the gross markup from its steady-state level, which is 
equal to the inverse of the marginal cost, i.e. ( )? ˆttMC µ= −  in logs.  
The log-linearization of the production function (17) and of the first order conditions ((22) and (23)) 
gives us the transition dynamic of the output (42) and the input demand schedules ((43) and (44)). 
                                                 
5 See the appendix for details. 
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The labor demand curve is downward sloping and depends negatively upon the labor taxation. The 
New Keynesian Phillips Curve is derived by solving the firm’s maximization problem (24) in a 
standard manner.6  
Regarding, the log-linearized version of the household’s optimality conditions, the log-linearized 
version of the capital accumulation equation is:  
(46) ( ) 11t t tk k iδ δ−= − +   
By rewriting the Ricardian leisure as a function of the aggregate employment (notice that 
( )1 ot o tn nλ γ= − , then ( ) ( )111 oo Nt tNl nλγ −−= −  and t tl nϕ= − , where 1 NNϕ −=  is the steady-state inverse 
Frisch labor supply elasticity), the optimal condition for Ricardian and Non Ricardian consumers 
can be rewritten as: rt t tw p c− = , ( )( )1 1oo Nt t t tNw p c nγ λ− −− = −  
( ) ( )( )( )111 1 11 1 .oo ot t t t t t tNc E c r E nσ νσ σ γ λπ −+ + +− −= − − + ∆  Both the labor supply schedules depend positively on 
the income tax rate since the latter affects the budget constraint of both the consumers. Only 
Ricardian consumers, instead, take account of the employment since the level of the employment of 
the rule of thumb is constant. The Euler equation is standard except for the presence of the 
deviations in employment. The presence of the deviations in employment is justified by the fact that 
the marginal utility of consumption in each period depends upon the leisure. If 1σ < , the marginal 
utility of consumption and leisure are positively related. An increase in current labor decreases the 
marginal utility of consumption and, ceteris paribus, current consumption must decrease.  
The log-linearized version of the aggregate labor supply is:  
(47) t t t tw p c nϕ− = +   
and log-linearized consumption is ( )1 o rt o t r tc c cλ γ λγ= − + . After some algebra we also obtain 
r
t t tc c nϕ= +  and ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1
1 1
1 1 1
.ot t tc c n
ν ν λϕ ϕ
ν ν λ ϕ
−
−
+ +
− + += − , the aggregate Euler Equation is thus:  
(48) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1
11
1 1 1
r
t t t t t t t
o r
N
c E c r E n
N
σ λϕγπ νσ σ γ λ λγ+ + +
⎡ ⎤−= − − − + ∆⎢ ⎥− − −⎣ ⎦
  
The log-linear equations describing the dynamics of Tobin’s Q and its relationship with investments 
are:  
(49) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11IIt t t t tq i k i kφ δ δ η− −= − − = −   
                                                 
6 See e.g. in Walsh (2003: Appendix 5.7.3). 
 12
(50) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 1 kt t t t t t t tq E q r p r Eβ β δ π+ + + += + − − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   
where η  represents the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to Q.  
The log-linear equations describing the dynamics of government purchases, dividends and 
aggregate resources around zero-debt steady state are given by:  
(51) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1
1 1
1
Y Y NY
t t tk
g t t t t t t Y
w p n
s g r p k d p
τ τ τ α τ ττ α
µ ε µ τ
Π Π
−
− + − + − += − + + − + −  
where gs  is given by equation (38).  
(52) ( ) ˆ1t t t td p y ε µ− = + −   
(53) t c t i t g ty s c s i s g= + +   
The central bank set the growth of interest rate in according to a standard Taylor rule:  
(54) t t y tr yπθ π θ= +   
It is worth remarking that the targets of the above rule are consistent with the steady-state properties 
of the model.   
 
4. Calibration and Analysis of Equilibrium Stability 
We can now combine equilibrium conditions (42)-(54) to obtain a system of difference equations 
describing the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics of our model economy. The system is composed 
of 13 equations in 13 unknowns ( ty , tk , tn , 
K
t tr p− , ˆtµ , tπ , ti , t tw p− , tc , tn , tr , tg , t td p− ). 
We use numerical methods for studying the uniqueness of the equilibrium and to provide a 
theoretical reason to the conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium. More precisely, 
we will focus on the difference between our conditions and those stressed by Galì et al. (2004) for 
the case of lump-sum taxation in order to check if the latter can be generalized.  
We calibrate our model following Galì et al. (2003), to compare the stabilization properties of a 
Taylor rule to their results. The labor disutility is set to obtain a steady state employment equal to 
1 2/  without tax distortions as in Galì et al. (2003). Tax rates are set according to Busato et al. 
(2005) whereas monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule. The table below summarizes the 
value assumed for the parameters.  
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Table 1 – Model calibration  
Deep parameters  0 99β = .   1ϕ =   1σ =   1η =    
 0 33α = .   6ε =   0 025δ = .   0.7ν =  
Calvo’s parameter  0 75ω = .  0.8λ =    
Monetary policy  1 5πθ = .   0 5yθ = .     
Tax rates  0 353τ Π = .   0 153Nτ = .   0 12Yτ = .    
 
 
Before stressing our results, it is useful to briefly discuss those of Galì et al. (2003, 2004) since our 
model generalizes their approach. In our framework, in fact, Galì et al. (2003) emerges as a 
particular case (i.e. assuming all the tax rates equal to zero).  
Galì and coauthors show that the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers can dramatically change the 
properties of the interest rate set accordingly a Taylor rule. More precisely, the combination 
between a high degree of price stickiness and a large share of rule-of-thumb consumers rules out the 
existence of a unique equilibrium converging to the steady state. Both frictions are necessary for 
having indeterminacy. Once that the Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) conditions are not satisfied, the 
equilibrium may be indeterminate and thus displaying sunspot fluctuations even when the interest 
rate rule satisfies the Taylor principle.  
The above results are driven by two imperfections: the presence of rule-of-thumb and counter-
cyclical markups. A decline in markups, associated to an increase in the economic activity, allows 
real wages to increase (see equation (44) disregarding taxes). Then the increase in real wages 
generates inflation and a boom in consumption among non Ricardian consumers. If the weight of 
the rule-of-thumb is sufficiently large, the rise in their consumption will more than offset the effect 
of the rise in interest rate on Ricardian consumption. In other words, the high share of rule-of-thumb 
can invert the mechanism of the Taylor principle. A shock in economic activity and inflation can be 
self-fulfilled, and fluctuations are induced by indeterminacy in the equilibrium path. That possibility 
is facilitated by a high relative risk aversion, since it dampens the response of the consumption of 
Ricardian households (as we can see in equation (48)). 
In our framework, this sunspot mechanism stressed by Galì et al. (2003) can be ruled out by 
introducing a positive corporate tax rate. Since the corporate tax rate burdens dividends, a decline in 
markups is now associated to a reduction in government expenditure. Because of the consequent 
reduction of aggregate demand the expansionary mechanism is hindered; therefore, the increase in 
non-Ricardian consumption can be more than offset by the decrease of public expenditure. 
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Corporate tax rate, by burdening markups, is able to stabilize the economy when the Taylor rule is 
unable to do it. Table 2 shows clearly that when the share of rule of thumb consumers is high 
enough, only a small threshold rate on profits could guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium, 
given that the Taylor rule needs a very high threshold inflation coefficient. By contrast, an increase 
in labor or income tax rate implies an increase in government expenditure, even if the markups 
decline, and so the regions of indeterminacy are not modified.  
 
Table 2 - Rule of thumb consumers, threshold inflation coefficient and threshold profit tax rate 
λ  πθ  πτ  
0.1 0.94 0 
0.2 0.94 0 
0.3 0.94 0 
0.4 0.94 0 
0.5 0.94 0 
0.6 0.94 0 
0.7 3.7 0.07 
0.8 12.2 0.26 
0.9 24.4 0.44 
 
 
In our calibration, taxation on profits affects conditions for indeterminacy: sunspots are less likely 
to be observed under fiscal distortions (see figure 1 below). As point out by Galì et al. (2003), 
results are strongly affected by the relative risk aversion and degree of stickiness. In our framework 
these effects are depicted in figure 1. 
The relative risk aversions may have strong effects on determinacy properties of a Taylor rule. 
Figure 1 shows the change of the regions of indeterminacy for the case of 1σ =  (panel (a)) and 
5σ =  (panel (b)). When 1σ =  the weight of the Ricardian-consumption reduction induced by 
monetary restriction is more important, indeterminacy requires a larger size of rule-of-thumb 
consumers relative to the case of 5σ = .7  
Regarding the Calvo’s parameter, in New Keynesian models, the impact of the current output (via 
markup) on current inflation by the Phillips curve is larger for low values of the Calvo’s parameter. 
Then the Taylor principle does not hold and multiple solutions become possible.8 
 
                                                 
7 Robustness of our results is also shortly discussed below and sensitivity analysis provided by appendix B.  
8 The indeterminacy caused by the excessive response of monetary policy has been emphasized by Bernanke and 
Woodford (1997). See also Clarida et al. (1998 and 1999) and Woodford (2004). 
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Figure 1 – Regions of indeterminacy 
(a) (b) 
 
 
By considering steady state value of employment smaller than 1/2, which is a smaller value than 
those commonly used in the literature, the share of rule of thumb consumers necessary to modify 
the regime of determinacy becomes higher than values presented in the case of Galì et al (2004). In 
fact, an equilibrium value of employment of 1/3 rises the share of rule-of-thumb consumers 
necessary for an indeterminacy regime to about 0.8, a value very similar to our result in presence of 
fiscal distortions, despite the ceteris paribus calibration used by Galì et al (2003, 2004), i.e. 
employment equal to 1/2. Therefore, the lack of robustness of their findings is emphasized by a 
lower employment steady state value since a very small corporate tax structure is more likely to 
remove regions of indeterminacy in presence of a monetary Taylor rule. 
Summarizing, we show that Galì et al. (2004) is not indifferent to fiscal policy structure. Our 
general result is that fiscal policy distortion on profits facilitates the Taylor criterion since, in such a 
case, sunspot-driven fluctuations in the business cycle are less likely to be observed. This occurs 
because when a sunspot mechanism driven by a decline in markups could act the taxation on profits 
it dampens the aggregate demand, through the reduction of government expenditure. Hence it 
breaks the movement leaded by the animal spirit hypothesis at the heart of the sunspot mechanism, 
i.e., the self-fulfilling prophecy of a reduction in markups. In our model, corporate taxation implies 
a new conjoint fiscal and monetary stabilization. The Taylor rule is generally known as a 
compelling criterion of policy stabilization, but we have proved that it does not hold if general 
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conditions are present, as e.g. fiscal distortions. We have in fact verified that when it fails fiscal 
policy could substitute the monetary policy in order to stabilize the economy. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Following the recent developments of literature on rule-of-thumb consumers in New Keynesian 
monetary model, we have analyzed the support of monetary and fiscal policies to saddle-path 
solutions by studying the determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium. By considering non-
lump-sum taxes and balanced budget, we have shown that standard models augmented with rule-of-
thumb consumers and fiscal policies are not indifferent to the taxation structure.    
Our general result is that fiscal policy is non-neutral with respect to equilibrium determinacy since 
fiscal distortions under balanced budget policy facilitate the stabilizing properties of the Taylor rule 
by restricting the possibility of sunspot-driven fluctuations in the business cycle, stressed by recent 
literature. More in detail, an increase in profit tax rate makes sunspot equilibria less likely to 
emerge.  
The rationale for our result is as follows. Sunspots or the animal spirit mechanism are the result of 
the self-fulfilling prophecy of a reduction in markups: since a decline in markups is associated to a 
reduction in government expenditure because of the corporate tax rate burdens dividends, fiscal 
distortions on profits dampen the aggregate demand, through the reduction of government 
expenditure, and make sunspot equilibria less likely to emerge. The size of effects on government 
expenditure depends on the profit tax rate. As result, the corporate tax rate, by burdening markups, 
stabilizes the economy when the Taylor rule is unable to do it. If the share of rule of thumb 
consumers is high enough, only a small rate on profits could guarantee the uniqueness of the 
equilibrium, given that the Taylor rule needs a very high coefficient to respond to the inflation and 
thus non-conventional results found in the case of a large number of rule-of-thumb consumers do 
not apply.  
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Appendix A – Labor disutility and steady state employment 
The steady-state level of aggregate employment is obtained as follows.  
(a.1) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 11 1 1 1
1 1 11 1 1
Y Y
N NY
c g
N
N s s
ε α ε α ρ δτ τ
ν ε τ ν τε ρ δ αδ τ ε
− − − − +− −= =− + +− + − − −  
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By using equation (40), after tedious algebra, the above expression can be also rewritten as: 
(a.3) 
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1 1 1 1 1 1
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N Y N Y
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ν ρ δ τ µ αδ τ τ α ρ δ τ
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⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
− + −= + − + − − + + − + −  
Equation (a.3) with equation (38) determines the level of employment as a function of the deep 
parameters only. It can be rewritten as: 
(a.4) 
( )( )
( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
Y
N Y N
gs
α ρ δ τν ϕ ρ δ τ µ αδ τ τ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
− + −= + − + − − + , 
 which can be used to find the labor disutility consistent with a given level of employment. 
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Appendix B – Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table 1B – Sensitivity analysis on output coefficient, capital adjustment cost, and labor elasticity  
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